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Abstract:
The  agency-stewardship  theoretical  framework  posits  that  CEOs  may 
choose to act as agents or as stewards. CEOs as agents are economically rational  
individuals driven by self-interest, whereas CEOs as stewards are self-actualizing 
individuals that behave pro-organizationally. Our study extends this framework to  
analyze whether the CEO´s behavior style affects the diversification-performance 
relationship. After applying Heckman´s method on a sample of Spanish firms, our  
results verify that diversification affects positively on firm performance and such  
effect is significantly strong when this strategy is managed and implemented by a  
CEO inclined to behave as steward.
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1. Introduction
An extensive research examines the relationship between diversification 
strategy  and firm performance  in  strategic  management  and  corporate  finance 
(Denis et al., 1997, 1999; Miller, 2004; Villalonga, 2004). Despite this research, 
the empirical evidence is inconclusive (Palich et al., 2000). Thus, new approaches 
are  necessary  to  investigate  the  diversification-performance  relationship.  One 
option is to consider the moderating role that certain variables can exercise on 
such a relationship. In this paper, we introduce one moderator that does not seem 
to have been the focus of any previous research: the behavior style of the CEO 
managing diversification.
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Different  behavior styles of the diversifying CEOs may lead to different 
styles  of  formulating and implementing diversification  and the effects  derived 
from this strategy depend on how it has been managed and implemented (Datta et 
al., 1991). For this reason, this paper aims to investigate whether the impact of 
diversification on firm performance depends on the behavior style of the CEO that 
engages in such strategy. Our study attempts to throw light on this question and its 
main  innovation  is  to  identify  the  CEO´s  behaviour  style  according  to 
psychological  and  situational  factors  within the agency-stewardship theoretical 
framework (Davis et al., 1997, 2004; Lee y O´Neill, 2003). 
The chosen theoretical framework seeks to explain variation in managerial 
behavior (Chrisman et al., 2007; Waserman, 2006). It argues that a manager may 
choose to behave as an agent or as a steward, and that this choice is contingent on 
his personal atributes -psychological factors- and on his perceptions of the firm 
that he manages -situational factors- (Davis et al., 1997, 2004). While agent-type 
managers  are  self-serving  individuals  that  act  oportunistically,  steward-type 
managers are self-actualizing individuals that act pro-organizationally. Drawing 
on  this  framework,  we  assume  that  CEOs  inclined  to  behave  as  agents  will 
diversify to attain personal benefits at the expense of firm wealth, whereas CEOs 
inclined  to  behave  as  stewards  will  use  diversification  to  achieve  corporate 
benefits from maximizing firm wealth. 
The contribution of this article to the existing literature is threefold. First, 
the study tests the applicability of the agency-stewardship debate by recognizing 
the  different  behaviors  styles  of  the  CEOs  that  diversify  and  including  this 
recognition in the empirical testing. Such a debate is one of the most promising 
lines of inquiry in the field of management, but little empirical evidence exists to 
justify its potential (Hoskisson  et al., 1999). Second, the study goes beyond the 
literature  on  diversification  effects  by  analyzing  whether  the  diversification-
performance relationship depends on the behavior style of the diversifying CEO. 
This variable may be a key moderator in such a relationship, since consequences 
derived from the participation in new activities may be contingent on the way 
CEOs formulate and implement this strategy (Datta et al., 1991; Hoskisson y Hitt, 
1990). Finally, the study also contributes from a methodological perspective by 
controlling  econometrically  for  endogeneity  bias  from  self-selection  in  the 
diversification-performance relationship.
The structure of the article is as follows. The next section develops the 
hypothesis  under  study  through  a  review  of  the  related  literature. Section  3 
contains the data and empirical methodology.  Section 4 reports the results. The 
final section offers some concluding remarks.
2. Literature review
2.1.  The  CEO´s  behaviour  style  within  the  agency-stewardship  theoretical  
framework
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Agency  theory  is  an  economic  approach  to  corporate  governance  and 
appears to be the dominant paradigm underlying most governance research. This 
perspective suggests that managers as agents are rational individuals that seek to 
maximize  their  own  utility  at  the  expense  of  corporate  wealth  (Jensen  and 
Meckling,  1976). Although the divergence of interests  between ownership and 
management may differ to varying degrees, agency theory claims that the model 
of the agent remains as inherently opportunistic, that is, in that there is an ever-
present possibility of opportunism, unless it is curbed through controls. 
In contrast, the stewardship theory is a new perspective to understanding 
top managers´ behavior (Davis  et al., 1997, 2004; Lee and O´Neill, 2003).  This 
theory  is  a  psycho-sociological  approach to  corporate  governance  that  depicts 
managers  as  stewards  of  organizations;  their  behavior  is  such  that  pro-
organizational and collectivist conducts have a higher utility than individualistic 
and self-serving ones (Chrisman et al., 2007). These managers are responsible for 
managing  heterogeneous  organizations  with  competing  stakeholders  objectives 
and make decisions that they perceive to be in the best interest of the group.  In 
such a situation, this theory assumes that a steward that enhances corporate wealth 
will  generally  satisfy  most  stakeholders  with  competing  interest  (Wasserman, 
2006). While stewardship theory in no way denies that managers may be self-
interested,  it  nevertheless  propounds  that  given  a  choice  between  self-serving 
conduct and pro-organizational conduct, stewards´ behavior will not depart from 
corporate interests.  Also, as their thought is that, behave according to it and not 
opportunistically does not involve a lack of rationality (Hernández, 2007).
The agency-stewardship debate posits that a CEO´s behavior style as agent 
or as steward may be described in terms of psychological and situational factors 
(Chrisman  et  al.,  2007;  Davis  et  al.,  1997,  2004;  Wasserman,  2006). 
Psychological factors refer to the manager´s personal characteristics and include 
work  motivation,  organizational  identification  and  use  of  power. Situational 
factors denote the manager´s perception of certain variables concerning the firm 
that  he  manages  such  as  management  philosophy  and  organizational  culture, 
particularly  the  individualism-collectivism  and  power  distance  dimensions. 
Within this framework, managers are more likely to behave as agents when they 
are  motivated  by  extrinsic  factors  (e.g.,  income,  work  conditions,  security  of 
employment,…),  when  they  have  low  identification  with  the  company,  use 
institutional power to influence subordinates, and belong to firms with a control-
oriented management philosophy and an individualistic and a high power distance 
culture. In  contrast,  managers  are  more likely to  become stewards  when they 
respond to intrinsic factors (e.g., recognition, personal satisfaction,…), when they 
identify closely with the firm, use personal power, and work in companies with an 
involvement-oriented management philosophy and a collectivist and low power 
distance culture (Davis et al., 1997, 2004).
2.2. The CEO´s behavior style as a moderator of the diversification-performance  
relationship 
Many  strategy  scholars  have  explained  the  importance  of  considering 
CEOs´  behavior  style  when  studying  the  effects  of  diversification  on  firm 
performance, since the extend to which potencial benefits of diversification are 
actually  achieved  depends  largely  on  how  effectively  it  is  managed  and 
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implemented (Datta  et  al.,  1991;  Hoskisson y Hitt,  1990). In fact,  CEOs may 
directly  contribute  to  diversification  success  or  failure  because  they  are 
responsible for formulating and implementing this strategy. This involves that the 
agency-stewardship framework might be used to analyze the moderating effect of 
the CEO´s behavior style on the diversification-performance relationship, given 
that  the  impact  of  this  strategy  on  firm  wealth  may  be  different  under  the 
management of a CEO that acts as an agent that under the management of a CEO 
that acts as a steward.
CEOs inclined to behave as agents will be willing to diversify, even at 
expense  of  corporate  wealth,  when large  personal  benefits  are  likely  to  ensue 
(Denis et al., 1997, 1999). Specifically, diversification may allow them to increase 
their compensation and status in the business community, to reduce their personal 
employment risk and to become entrenched by directing this strategy in a way 
consistent  with  their  own skills (Aggarwal  and  Samwick,  2003).  As  a  result, 
CEOs  closer  to  the  agent  model  will  place  greater  emphasis  on  managerial 
benefits when managing diversification. For this reason, they will choose the most 
adequate strategy and try to implement the most effective organizational structure, 
culture and processes to attain such personal benefits, even if this come at the cost 
of  organizational  losses  (Hoskisson  y  Hitt,  1990;  Datta  et  al.,  1991). 
Consequently,  we expect  that  the closer the behavior style  of  the diversifying 
CEO is to agent model, the lower the effect of diversification will be on firm 
performance. 
In contrast, CEOs inclined to behave as stewards, as individuals prone to 
serve  the  good of  the  firm,  are  likely  to  use  their  position  to  pursue  wealth-
maximizing diversification strategies (Fox and Hamilton, 1994; Ramaswamy  et 
al.,  2002).  Market  power,  economies  of  scope  and  internal  market  efficiency 
arguments allow us to explain how diversification can maximize corporate wealth 
(Palich  et  al.,  2000).  Thus,  when managing  and  implementing  diversification, 
these top managers will place greater emphasis on corporate benefits derived from 
any of  the  above  three  sources.  For  this  reason,  they  will  formulate  the  best 
strategy and establish the best organization to achieve such benefits, which will 
have a favorable effect on firm wealth.  Therefore, we expect that the closer the 
behavior style of the diversifying CEO is to steward model, the greater the effect 
of diversification will be on firm performance.
3. Methods
3.1. Population
The population of interest comprises Spanish public companies with total 
sales greater than three million euros and more than 100 employees every year 
during the  period  1997-2001.  The  Dun&Bradstreet  Directory  yields  a  total  of 
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3,655  firms  fulfilling  these  criteria.  However,  the  question  of  evaluating 
diversification effects is best broached by focusing on firms when they decide to 
diversify for the first time, that is, when they increase their number of business 
segments  from one  to  two or  more  (Miller,  2004;  Villalonga,  2004).  For  this 
reason, we restrict the research to firms reporting only one business segment at the 
four-digit  SIC level in  1997,  excluding all  companies specializing in  financial 
services, regulated utilities, government and non-classifiable establishments. After 
applying these restrictions, the final population consists of 1,256 specialized firms 
in 1997. Of these, 520 companies make the initial decision to diversify during the 
1998-2001 period and 736 remain specialized. 
3.2. Sample and data collection
The information required to identify the type of CEO that diversifies is not 
publicly available. We carried out a mail survey to collect these data between May 
and July 2003. The questionnaire was sent to the CEOs of the 520 diversifying 
firms  in  the  population  to  obtain  their  psychological  and  situational  profile. 
Furthermore,  the questionnaire  also inquired about  the  year  they occupied the 
CEO position. As we knew the year when each firm diversified, we were able to 
determine whether the manager answering the questionnaire was also the CEO 
that managed and implemented diversification. If this was not the case, the firm 
was dropped from the sample. Next, CEOs were asked to state the firm´s different 
business segments when they decided to diversify and the percentage sales in each 
business segment. A valid response rate of 22.7 percent provides a sample of 118 
diversifying  companies  (sampling  error  was  8.1  percent  with  a  95  percent 
confidence level). 
However,  “the  confidence  with  which  one  can  draw conclusions  from 
empirical studies of strategic phenomena is significantly limited if the sample is 
constructed of firms that have experienced the phenomenon under study” (Jensen 
and Zajac, 2004: 512). Therefore, each diversifying firm from the sample was 
paired with one of the 736 specialized firms from the population to avoid the 
sample selection bias. Matching criteria were proposed by Miller (2004) for a 
similar purpose: sharing the same principal business at the two-digit SIC code 
level and having a similar size (within 70-130 percent of sales and/or employees) 
in the year prior to the diversification event. After applying these criteria, the final 
sample  consists  of  236  firms,  distributed  equally  between  diversifying  and 
specialized companies. 
3.3. Independent variable
We measured firm diversification using the entropy index (Jacquemin and 
Berry, 1979): 
                                       where n is number of the firm´s business segments and Pi 
is  ith  business  segment´s  sales  divided  by  the  firm´s  total  sales.  The  entropy 
measure increases with greater diversification and combines objectivity, content 
and construct validity, and simplicity. 
                 n
DIV   =   Σ Pi ln (1/Pi),
               i=1
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3.4. Dependent variable
We measured  the  effect  of  diversification  on  performance  in  terms  of 
variation in return on assets (ROA). After estimating the average ROA for the 3-
year pre- and post-diversification periods, we calculated the percentage change in 
average ROA of both periods (Desai  et al., 2005). Performance data were taken 
from the SABI database.
3.5. Moderating variable  
As  there  are  no  empirical  tests  for  the  agency-stewardship  theoretical 
framework introduced by Davis et al. (1997), the study creates a measure of the 
behavior style of the CEO managing diversification. This measure consists of 30 
items  encompassing  the  three  psychological  factors  and  the  three  situational 
factors  that  define  the  construct  to  be  measured. The  theoretical  basis  for 
constructing items is as follows (see Appendix 1): 
Work  Motivation is  measured  with  a  four-item  scale  according  to  Maslow´s 
Model of Needs (1954); there are two items on intrinsic or higher order needs and 
two on extrinsic or lower order needs.
Organizational identification is quantified using a five-item scale adapted from 
Mayer and Schoormand´s approach (1992).
Use of power is assessed with five items that mirror French and Raven´s (1959) 
five bases of power: legal,  reward,  coercitive,  referential  and expert.  The first 
three  are  manifestations  of  institutional  power  and  the  other  two  of  personal 
power.
Management Philosophy is measured with a six-item scale adapted from Lawler 
(1986). 
Organizational Culture is assessed with a ten-item scale adapted from Hofstede´s 
(1980) study; there are  five items on the  individualism-collectivism dimension 
and other five on the power distance dimension.
We obtained this information from the questionnaire completed by the CEOs 
of  the  118  diversifying  firms  in  our  sample.  Managers  are  asked  to  rate  the 
importance  of  each  item  on  a  Likert-type  scale,  using  seven-point  “strongly 
disagree”  to  “strongly  agree”  response  options.  After  recoding  inversely 
formulated  items,  a  low score  indicates  that  CEOs  are  inclined  to  behave  as 
agents,  whereas  a  high  score  indicates  that  CEOs  are  inclined  to  behave  as 
stewards. Our 30-item measure has a Cronbach´s alpha of 0.909 and all items load 
strongly on one single factor (61.01 percent of total variance). 
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The study  employed  data  obtained  from the  questionnaire  to  construct  an 
index of the CEO´s behavior style for each diversifying firm in the sample. The 
index is  computed by adding together each manager´s scores for all  30 items, 
providing a range of values between 30 and 210. We use a simple addition in this 
particular case for at least three reasons: a) information is not available to weight 
a  priori any  of  the  items  utilized;  b)  reliability  and  dimensionality  analysis 
highlight  that  all  items measure the same construct  and can thus  be added to 
provide a single score, and c) a simple addition has the advantage of being clear 
and allowing easy interpretation. The index obtained was normalized to provide 
values of between 0 and 100, with CEOs closer to the agent model having the 
lower values and CEOs closer to the steward model having higher index scores. 
Using a continuous variable is justifiable because our aim is to measure the 
type of CEO managing diversification more accurately. In fact, Davis et al. (1997) 
point out that their approach assumes that managers choose to act exclusively as 
agents or as stewards as a first step in establishing the contrast between agency 
and  stewardship  theories. However,  they  also  accept  that  from  a  practical 
perspective such an assumption could be viewed as a limitation, as individuals 
tend not to behave in such a black and white fashion. 
3.6. Control variables
The analysis utilized the following control variables: (a) one variable to 
identify  the  type of diversification,  that  takes a  value of  1  if  firms operate  in 
different two-digit SIC industry (unrelated diversification) and a value of 2 if they 
operate in different four-digit SIC industries but within a two-digit SIC industry 
(related diversification); (b) one variable to account for the corporate control,  that 
takes a value of 1 if firms are owner-controlled (external owners have 5 percent or 
more  of  the  outstanding  shares)  or  owner-manager  controlled  (CEOs  have  2 
percent or more of the outstanding shares) the year of diversification and a value 
of 2 if  firms are manager-controlled (external ownership is  diffused and CEO 
ownership is limited); and (c) three firm-level variables such as size (log of total 
assets),  profitability (ROA) and  investment  (capital expenditures/sales), and one 
industry-level variable (four-digit SIC) such as  industry ROA. We calculate  3-
year pre-diversification averages for these four variables. All necessary data to 
construct  control  variables  were  taken  from  the  SABI  database  and  the 
Duns&Bradstreet Directory.
3.7. Model specification
Standard regression techniques are not able to control for the endogeneity 
bias from self-selection associated with studying the diversification-performance 
relationship. One solution is to apply Heckman´s (1979) two-stage method. In the 
first  stage, the  procedure  estimates  the  selection  equation  as  a  maximum-
likelihood probit model to analyze the propensity to diversify and calculate  the 
inverse  Mills  ratio. In  the  second  stage,  the  corrected  regression  equation  is 
estimated  by  OLS  regression  to  examine  the  effects  of  diversification  on 
performance.  In  this  case,  the  study  considers  the  following  selection  and 
regression equations: 
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Yi =  α +  β1Di+  β2 Ci +  β3 (Di  x  Ci)+  β4 Xi  +  εi   (regression  equation) 
(1)                                 
where Yi is the diversifying firm´s i performance; Di  a diversification index; Ci an 
index of the CEO type; (Di  x Ci) an interaction factor between diversification and 
type of CEO; Xi a vector of control variables and εi a normal error term.
DIVi*  =  γ Zi +  μi  (selection  equation) 
(2)                                      
where the latent variable DIVi* is observed as DIVi = 1 (the firm i decides 
to diversify) if  DIVi* >  0 or as DIVi  = 0 (the firm i decides not to diversify) if 
DIVi* ≤ 0;  Zi is a vector of variables that affect a firm´s propensity to diversify 
(all control variables from the regression equation but the type of diversification, 
since they also relate to the choice to diversify) and μi is a normal error term. This 
model uses data from both diversifying firms and matching specialized firms. 
However,  the  fact  that  Yi is  only  observed  if  DIVi  = 1  might  lead  to 
endogeneity bias from self-selection. Heckman´s method eliminates this bias in 
the following way: on the one hand, it  requires identifying at least one variable 
that  may  be  a  significant  regressor  in  the  selection  equation  but  not  in  the 
regression equation. While other variables may be available, the fraction of firms 
in  the  main  industry  that  are  diversified  (Villalonga,  2004)  resulted  to  be 
appropriate.  Due to data limitations, this variable had to be calculated from our 
population. On the other hand, Heckman´s method requires including the ‘inverse 
Mills ratio’ (λi) as an additional regressor in the regression equation. The inverse 
Mills  ratio  approximates  the  likelihood  of  diversification  in  each  firm  and  is 
calculated by diverse statistical  programmes using estimates obtained from the 
selection  equation. After  incorporating  this  correction,  the  final  regression 
equation is: 
Yi = α + β1Di+ β2 Ci + β3 (Di  x Ci)+ β4 Xi  + θλi     (corrected regression equation) 
(3) 
4. Results
Table 1 presents means, standard deviations and correlation coeficients for 
all  variables  used  in  this  study. Although  the  CEO-type  variable  shows  high 
correlation  with  diversification,  the  examination  of  variance  inflation  factors 
(VIFs) indicates no evidence of  multicolineality.
Table 1. Means, standard deviations and pairwise correlations
Selection equation    
Variables     (N = 236) Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Diversification 
(dummy)
 0.5  0.50  1.00
2. Corporate control  1.2  0.42  0.01  1.00
3. Log of total assets 17.1  1.23 -0.25**
*
-0.08 1.00
4. Firm ROA  4.5  9.55  0.11†  0.01 0.04 1.00
5. CAPEX/Sales  0.4  0.70 -0.06  0.10 0.03 0.02  1.00
6. Industry ROA -1.8 22.85 -0.16* -0.09 0.19** 0.03 -0.07  1.00
7. Fraction diversified 
firms
 6.3  3.19  0.16*  0.03 0.03 0.07 -0.11† -0.03
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†p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
Table 2 reports the results of our first-stage probit regression. Using  the 
full sample of diversifying and specialized firms, the study proves that firm size 
and  industry  ROA affect  negatively  and  significantly  on  firms´  propensity  to 
diversify for the first time, whereas firm ROA and the fraction of firms in the 
industry that are diversified have a positive effect.  
Table 2. First-stage probit regression predicting propensity to diversify
 
Variables Coefficients S.E. z-Statistic
Constant       4.265*** 1.321  3.23
Corporate control -0.061 0.205 -0.30
Log of total assets       -0.275*** 0.075 -3.65
Firm ROA    0.022† 0.012  1.87
CAPEX/Sales -0.106 0.130 -0.81
Industry ROA   -0.016* 0.008 -2.11
Fraction diversified firms    0.066* 0.027  2.41
Number of total observations 236
Number  of  censured 
observations
118
Log-likelihood test statistic          33.16***
Pseudo-R2   0.1013
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
In  the  second  stage  of  the  Heckman  method,  the  study  applies  a 
hierarchical moderated regression analysis in order to test the performance effects 
of diversification. Table 3 summarizes regression results. All models show that 
the coefficient of the λi variable is not significant, indicating the absence of sample 
selection  bias. However,  by  controlling  for  this  bias,  diversification  per  se is 
shown to have a significant positive effect on change in firm ROA. Results also 
demonstrate  that  the  management  practices  of  CEOs  inclined  to  behave  as 
stewards  have  a  substantial  direct  impact  on  enhanced  firm  profitability. 
Furthermore, the R2 of Model 2 is significantly higher than in Model 1, indicating 
a possible moderating effect of the behavior style of the diversifying CEO on the 
diversification-performance relationship. Specifically, the positive and significant 
coefficient for the interaction term would suggest that the greater the value of the 
CEO´s behavior style variable (i.e., the closer the diversifying manager is to the 
steward  model),  the  greater  the  effect  of  diversification  on  performance;  or 
Regression equation    
Variables    (N=118) Mean
S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Change in ROA  0.2  1.46  1.00
2. CEO type 50.1 13.70  0.31***  1.00
3. Diversification  0.7  0.41  0.25** -0.31***  1.00
4. Type of 
diversification
 1.4  0.48  0.22*  0.02  0.08  1.00
5. Corporate control  1.2  0.42 -0.20* -0.04 -0.14 -0.08  1.00
6.  Log of total assets 16.7  1.16 -0.05  0.10 -0.12  0.05 -0.01 1.00
7.  Firm ROA  5.3 12.19  0.06  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.09 0.07  1.00
8.  CAPEX/Sales  0.4  0.57 -0.04  0.03 -0.03 -0.02  0.03 0.05 -0.01  1.00
9.  Industry ROA -5.6 20.94  0.02 -0.04  0.01  0.09 -0.11 0.06  0.09 -0.12
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alternatively, the lower the value of the CEO´s behavior style variable (i.e., the 
closer the diversifying manager is to the agent model), the lower the impact of 
diversification on performance. Thus, this result would, a priori, appear to confirm 
our hypothesis. 
However, since the correlation between CEO-type and diversification is 
important  (rDC  = -0.31***), the significant moderating effect might be simply a 
nonlinear effect between diversification and firm profitability (Carte and Russell, 
2003). This can be checked by adding the quadratic effects of the dependent and 
moderating variables to regression analysis. Results after controlling for quadratic 
effects show a significant increase in R2 of Model 4 compared to Model 3, and an 
interaction  term  with  a  positive  and  significant  coefficient. Both  indicators 
confirm  the  previously  observed  moderating  effect  and  provide  considerable 
support for the hypothesis under study.
Table 3.  Hierarchical regression analysis: Effect of diversification on firm profitability
Dependent variable: Change in ROA
Variables Model 1 Model 2a Model 3a Model 4a
Constant -0.073(2.722)
2.765
(2.482)
3.081
(2.704)
2.610  
(2.460)
Diversification type 0.495*(0.237)
0.551*
(0.232)
0.492*
(0.238)
0.543*
(0.228)
Corporate control -0.481(0.304)
-0.443
(0.280)
-0.496
(0.311)
-0.554*
(0.284)
Log of total assets -0.219(0.189)
-0.178
(0.174)
-0.222
(0.190)
-0.178  
(0.173)
Firm ROA 0.013(0.014)
0.005
(0.013)
0.013
(0.014)
0.007
(0.013)
CAPEX/Sales -0.171(0.230)
-0.057
(0.220)
-0.174
(0.231)
-0.036  
(0.218)
Industry ROA -0.006(0.009)
-0.003
(0.008)
-0.006
(0.009)
-0.004
(0.008)
Diversification 1.235***(0.304)
1.385***
(0.300)
1.216***   
(0.322)
1.226***   
(0.307)
CEO type 0.044***(0.009)
0.047***
(0.009)
0.044***
(0.009)
0.046***   
(0.009)
Diversification x CEO 
type
0.058**
(0.022)
0.084***
(0.026)
Diversification2
0.073
(0.492)
0.098
(0.548)
CEO type2
0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
Lambda (λ) 0.899(0.962)
0.359
(0.914)
0.919
(0.975)
0.425
(0.906)
Waldb χ2(10) = 50.64*** χ2(11) = 60.52***
χ2(12) = 50.73*** χ2(13) = 
65.82***
Adjusted-R2 0.226 0.261 0.212 0.269
Δ Adjusted-R2 0.035** 0.057***
N 118 118 118 118
a The two continuous variables used in interaction terms were centered. Results are similar if uncentred.
b Wald test is a χ2 test of all coefficients in the regression model, except the constant, being 0 (Heckman, 1979).
 
Values are unstandardized coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses
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† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
5. Concluding discussion
Several  scholars  have  recommended  examining  whether  the 
diversification-performance  relationship  may  depend  on  how  such  strategy  is 
managed and implemented (Datta  et al., 1991; Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990). This 
study takes up the call for action, analysing whether the behavior style of the CEO 
managing  diversification  may  moderate  the  impact  of  this  strategy  on  firm 
performance in Spanish firms. 
Results show that CEOs inclined to behave as stewards act to maximize 
profitability in general, but they are particularly influential when using corporate 
resources to diversify; or alternatively, CEOs inclined to behave as agents make 
strategic  decisions  that  reduce  profitability  in  general,  and  this  effect  is 
significantly strong when they decide to diversify. Overall,  our results provide 
general support for the notion that steward-managed firms obtain higher levels of 
performance  from  diversification  than  agent-managed  firms.  These  findings 
highlight that the impact of diversification on performance is not homogeneous 
across  all  CEOs  managing  diversification.  Indeed,  we  find  evidence  that  the 
differences in profitability effects stemming from the decision to diversify are not 
driven  by  diversification  per  se but  rather  by  the  fact  that  the  action  of  this 
strategy on profitability may be modified by the behavior style of the CEO that 
diversifies, whatever the level of diversification achieved. 
The  behavior  style  of  CEOs  managing  the  diversifying  firm  has 
implications on the way they exercise their power and hence on their preferences 
and styles of formulating and implementing the participation in new activities, 
which  is  reflected  in  profitability  benefits  derived  from  their  diversification 
efforts.  The  findings  also  indicate  that  there  are  gains  to  be  obtained  by 
considering  the  gamut of  human motivations  and behaviors.  Although agency 
problems  certainly  exist  if  agent-type  CEOs  manage  diversification,  such 
problems  disappear  when  CEOs  closer  to  the  steward  model  expand  firms’ 
operations to maximize corporate wealth. Thus, the study shows that self-interest 
is not the only valid managerial behavior behind diversification.
Despite  certain  limitations  to  the  study,  such  as  assuming  that 
diversification  always  coincides  with  CEOs´  preferences  or  that  their  profile 
remains constant over time, this article may be relevant to both researchers and 
practitioners.  For  researchers,  the  contradictory findings  of  the  diversification-
profitability relationship may be partially explained by considering that such a 
relationship  may  be  contingent  on  how  diversification  is  managed  and 
implemented and, more specifically, on whether the CEO that diversifies is more 
inclined to behave as agent or as steward. For practioners, our results reveal that 
whenever  diversifying  firms  stress  profitability,  it  is  important  to  foster  the 
conditions  under  which  stewardship  relationships  can  flourish.  Firms  should 
therefore ensure that individuals selected to the post of CEO have a psychological 
profile that predisposes them to behave as stewards. Moreover, firms should pay 
particular attention to implementing the situational conditions that are necessary 
to guarantee the pro-organizational behavior of their top managers. 
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Measure items of the CEO´s behavior style
IM1 It is important for me to get the recognition I deserve when I do a good job
IM2 I need to feel proud of my own work
EM3 I like hard work to earn a lot of money 
EM4 It is important for me to get promotion at work and have security of employment 
ID1 I am committed to the goals of this organization
ID2 I really do not care what happens to this organization
ID3 I am proud to tell others that I am part of this organization
ID4 I find that my values and the organization´s values are very similar
ID5 I am not willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond that normally expected for helping this 
firm
PP1 Employees acknowledge my experience when they have to comply with my orders
PP2 Employees identify with me and try to act as I do  
IP3 I gain my obedicence through sanctions and threats
IP4 I reward employees that act as I want
IP5 I use my authority to ensure that employees accomplish their duties
MP1 Within  the  firm there  is  a  strict  control  over  how employees  do  their  work  and  the  results 
obtained 
MP2 The firm confronts increased uncertainty through more empowerment in employees
MP3 Employees not only carry out their work, but organize and control it
MP4 There is a low level of trust throughout this firm
MP5 Employees do not have the freedom to decide how they are going to carry out their work  
MP6 There is fluent communication between employees and management team within this firm
IC1 The company´s members may be expected to give up their goals in order to benefit group success 
IC2 The firm lacks team spirit
IC3 Firm success is usually attributed to all its members 
IC4 There is a cooperative atmosphere in this firm to benefit group success
IC5 Employees´ individual development and independence is encouraged in this firm
DP1 The main function of the employees is to follow instructions given by the management team 
DP2 The management team takes most decisions after consultation with subordinates 
DP3 The company´s members are encouraged to express their own ideas and opinions 
DP4 Individuals at the top have much more power than individuals lower in this firm
DP5 Employees can disagree with management decisions 
Variables Code                 
IM Intrinsic Motivations
EM Extrinsic Motivations
ID Identification with the firm
PP Personal Power
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IP Institutional Power
MP Management philosophy
IC Individualism/Collectivism
PD Power distance
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